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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARD
FOR SEARCHES OF STUDENTS
BY SCHOOL OFFICIALS:
REASONABLE SUSPICION OR
PROBABLE CAUSE?
Lois YANKOWSKI

*

INTRODUCTION

The fourth amendment rights of students subjected to searches by
school administrators or teachers has been the subject of much legal
debate and confusion.' The Supreme Court has never considered the
issue of search and seizure in the schools and has never addressed even
the more general question of whether fourth amendment protections
apply to juveniles. The lower courts which have examined the school
search issue, with one exception, 2 have provided students with substantially less fourth amendment protection than adults in non-school
environments enjoy. These courts have focused on the in loco parentis
status of school officials and have found that either (1) no state action
is involved and, therefore, no fourth amendment rights apply, 3 or, (2)
while there is state action, the in loco parentisstatus of school officials
and their unique responsibilities and powers justify a less than proba4
ble cause standard for searches.

Some school administrators, perhaps inspired by this judicially
permissive attitude towards school searches, have resorted to the use
of strip searches of students in an effort to control drug use. In a
public controversy over the use of such highly intrusive tactics, a
district principal in Dutchess County, New York, defended his use of
strip searches by stating that counseling and other less intrusive mea-

* Attorney/Professor, Antioch School of Law; State University of New York at Albany, B.S.
1972; Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 1975; Georgetown University Law Center,
L.L.M. 1979.
1 See Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Public Schools, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 739
(1974); Shaw, Admissibility, in Criminal Case, of Evidence Obtained by Search Conducted by
School Official or Teacher, 48 A.L.R.3d 978 (1973).
2 State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317 (La. 1975).
3 See, e.g., In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); People v.
Stewart, 63 Misc.2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Crim. Ct. 1970); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
4 See, e.g., Bellneir v. Lund, 438 F.Supp. 47 (N.D. N.Y. 1972); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d
869 (Del. Super. 1971); Nelson v. State, 319 So.2d 154 (Fla. App. 1975); State v. Young, 234 Ga.
488 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975); People v. D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466 (1974).
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sures had proved ineffective. 5 The Secondea and Seventh Circuitsb
have faced the issue of strip searches in the context of civil suits for
damages following strip searches of students in which no contraband
was discovered.
This paper will focus on the fourth amendment rights of students
with respect to personal searches 7 conducted by school officials without the involvement of law enforcement authorities. Special emphasis
will be given to exploring the rights of students in relation to strip
searches since use of this tactic seems to be gaining popularity among
school officials.
The issues which will be addressed are whether the fourth
amendment applies to juveniles and, in particular, students; assuming
the fourth amendment does apply, what is the appropriate standard
of suspicion, i.e. probable cause or some lesser standard, which should
govern searches of students by school officials; and the remedies available to students who are subjected to illegal searches.
DoEs

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLY TO JUVENILEs?

In considering the applicability of the fourth amendment to
school searches, it is necessary to first consider the broader question of
whether the fourth amendment protects juveniles since most students
in elementary and junior and senior high school fit within this category.8
The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the issue of
whether the fourth amendment applies to juveniles. The Court's decisions concerning other basic constitutional guarantees, however, give
a strong indication that the Court would extend fourth amendment
protections to juveniles. In the case of In re Gault," the Court considered the rights of juveniles in the context of delinquency proceedings.
It held that juveniles are entitled to basic due process rights including

N.Y. Times, June 28, 1979, section B, at p. 4.
6a M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588 (2nd Cir. 1979).

eb Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980).
This paper will focus on personal searches, i.e., of students' persons and immediate
effects, and not on the search of school lockers in which the courts have frequently ruled that
school authorities maintain a proprietary interest which is co-existent to the students' interests.
In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
8 Some students, however, have faced adult criminal charges as a result of evidence uncovered during school searches, State v. Young, 234 Ca. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975), and have been
sentenced to terms of imprisonment, State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317 (La. 1975). Therefore, while
an analysis of students' rights necessarily includes an examination of the rights of juveniles, they
are by no means identical.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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the right to adequate notice of the charges against them, 0 the right to
be represented by counsel and to have appointed counsel if indigent,"
the privilege against self-incrimination, 2 and the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses.' 3 In subsequent cases, the Court has
also extended to juveniles the right to have guilt in delinquency pro4
ceedings judged by the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt," '
and has applied the provisions of the double jeopardy clause to delinquency proceedings.' 5
But while the Court has provided juveniles with these basic
constitutional rights, it has declined to require that all rights enjoyed
by adults must also be afforded juveniles. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 6 the Court refused to grant juveniles the right to trial by jury in
delinquency proceedings. The Court explained its decision by noting
that the due process standard formulated in Gault to be applied to
juvenile cases is fundamental fairness."' Since juries are not an essential component of accurate factfinding, the Court held that they are
not fundamental to a fair trial. For support, the Court cited numerous
adjudicatory proceedings such as military trials and probate actions,
which do not require juries.' 8
The question raised by McKeiver is whether or not the fourth
amendment is considered a fundamental right under the due process
clause. This issue has already been answered in the affirmative by the
series of cases which led to the application of the exclusionary rule to
the States. Perhaps the clearest pronouncement is found in Wolf v.
People of the State of Colorado9 where the Court stated:
The security of one's person against arbitrary intrusion by the
police-which is at the core of the fourth amendment-is basic to
a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered
liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause. 20
Although the Wolf decision held that the fourth amendment was
enforceable against the States, it did not require the States to use the
10 Id. at 31-34.
'2
's

Id. at 34-42.
Id. at 47-55.
Id. at 56-57.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
,6 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
17 Id. at 543.
18 Id.
19 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
20 Id. at 27-28.
14
15
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exclusionary rule to enforce the ban against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 2 ' This part of Wolf was overturned by Mapp v. Ohio 2 in
which the Court made the exclusionary rule applicable to the States as
well.
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the
Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the
right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers
is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that
right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the
same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the
Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at
the whim of any police officer, who in the name of law enforce23
ment itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
These cases definitively establish that the fourth amendment is a
fundamental right under the due process clause. Under the test established in Gault, there is little question that juveniles should be extended fourth amendment protection. It seems clear that the Supreme
Court, which has already extended fifth and sixth amendment rights
to juveniles, 24 would follow its own precedents as to the fundamental
nature of the fourth amendment and require that juveniles receive the
benefits of its protections as well. The lower courts which have considered the issue are apparently confident that the Supreme Court would
rule in favor of fourth amendment protection for juveniles. They have
all ruled that juveniles, like adults, are entitled to be protected against
unreasonable searches and seizures and have held the fourth amend25
ment applicable to juveniles.
DOES

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECT STUDENTS IN
SEARCHES BY SCHOOL OFFICIALS?

The fourth amendment secures the right of the people to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 26 The ban against unrea-

:I Id. at 27.
2 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

23 Id.

at 660.

See p. 143 supra.
15 S. Davis, Rights of Juveniles, 55 (1975). See, e.g., In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 366, 582 P.2d
24

957 (1978); State v. Lowry, 95 N.J. Super. 307, 230 A.2d 907 (1967); In-re Harvey, 222 Pa.
Super. 222, 295 A.2d 93 (1972).
26 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized."
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sonable searches and seizures, made applicable to the States through
the fourteenth amendment, 27 governs only the actions of government
agents, however, and is not applicable to searches by private individuals. 28 The threshold question in fourth amendment analysis of
school searches is whether school officials act as government agents or
as private individuals in conducting searches of students.
In cases where school officials act together with law enforcement
authorities in conducting the search, the search is likely to be characterized as a search under state authority and subject to the full limita30
tions of the fourth amendment. 29 In the case of Picha v. Wieglos,
for example, school officials received information that a female student was carrying drugs. The police were notified and responded to
the school prior to the search of the student. The court ruled that the
probable cause standard applied to this search since, once the police
were involved, the primary purpose of the search was to collect evidence for criminal prosecution rather than for educational purposes. 3' Similarly, searches by school security guards, whose role in
the schools is indistinguishable from that of police officers on the
streets, have been held to require full fourth amendment protec32
tions.
In situations where school officials conduct searches alone, without the presence of law enforcement personnel, the courts have frequently found that the officials, because of their in loco parentis
status, are acting as private individuals not subject to the limitations
of the fourth amendment. 33 The rationale of the court in Mercer v.
State 34 is typical of cases where the courts have prematurely ended
their fourth amendment analysis with a finding of no state action. In
Mercer, the dean of the high school received a tip that a particular
student possessed marijuana. The dean relayed the information to the
school principal who brought the student to his office and directed the
student to empty his pockets. The student complied and produced
marijuana. 35 The court held that "[t]he principal in dealing with
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
29 See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Picha v. Wieglos, 410
1976); Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University,
F.Supp. 1214 (N.D. I11.
284 F.Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968). Contra, In re Boykin, 39 I11.2d 617, 237 N.E. 2d 460 (1968).
30 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
31 Id. at 1221.
32 People v. Bowers, 72 Misc.2d 800, 339 N.Y.S. 2d 783, affd, 77 Misc.2d 697, 356 N.Y.S. 2d
432 (1974).
33 Cases cited note 3 supra.
34 450 S.W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
3- Id. at 716.
27
28
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appellant acted in loco parentis, not for an arm of the government,
when he demanded that appellant disclose the contents of his
pockets" 36 and that, therefore, the fourth amendment was inapplicable. The court reasoned that the school principal had been delegated from the parent those powers necessary to effectuate school
purposes which included the right to discover and bring under control
the possession of dangerous drugs within the educational system. The
principal's actions were characterized as those of a parent and not a
37
government official.
The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the government
agent or private individual status of school officials during searches of
students at school. The Court has decided cases concerned with other
areas of students' rights, however, and these decisions give no support
to the Mercer court's holding.
With respect to other constitutional guarantees, the Court has
consistently ruled that school officials' actions are subject to the limitations imposed by the United States Constitution. In West Virginia
State Board of Educationv. Barnette, 31the Court struck down school
regulations compelling students to pledge and salute the flag as violative of the first amendment as applied to the States through the
fourteenth amendment. 3 The extension of constitutional guarantees
to the schools was continued in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District40 and Goss v. Lopez. 41 In Tinker, the Court held that
a school regulation which prohibited the wearing of black armbands
in protest of the Vietnam War violated students' first amendment
rights. In Goss, school officials actions in suspending students without
notice and without any opportunity to explain their conduct violated
42
the students' due process rights under the fourteenth amendment.
Since the degree of state involvement which accompanies school
officials actions is sufficient to trigger the protection of the first and
fourteenth amendment, there is little basis for suggesting that it would
not trigger fourth amendment protection as well. In considering the
legality of a school search, the New Mexico Court of Appeals found
this logic compelling, and citing Tinker and Goss,43 stated that "it
31 Id. at 717.
37 Id.

319 U.S, (1943).
3'"[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against
the State itself and all of its creatures--Boards of Education not excepted." Id. at 637.
40 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
42 Id. at 584.
43 Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 827 (New Mex. 1975).
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cannot be denied that this action by a public school official is 'state
action', rendering the fourth amendment applicable through the four-

teenth."

44

Further support for finding state action in school search incidents
is found in Wood v. Strickland,45 where the Supreme Court ruled that
school officials actions could be the basis for a suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, subject to a good faith defense. §1983 creates a cause of action
for deprivations, under the color of state law, of rights secured by the
Constitution and federal laws (emphasis added) . 4 As stated by the
Court in State v. Baccino,4 7 "since 42 U.S.C. §1983 requires the
principal's actions to be ' state action' in order for a Federal court to
recognize a cause of action, it is difficult to see how a principal could
also be a private official for the purposes of the fourth amendment at
48
the same time."
In conclusion, the holdings of Tinker, Goss and Wood collectively provide overwhelming support for the proposition that when
school officials search students, the search is a "state action" and,
49
therefore, subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment.
WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDREASONABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE CAUSE-WHICH SHOULD
GOVERN SEARCHES OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL OFFICIALS?

While many of the more recent decisions have, in fact, found
"state action" in school search cases, the courts, with two notable
exceptions, 5° have permitted the searches on a less than probable cause
standard. 5 1 The Supreme Court of Georgia has stated that the fourth
52
amendment places only minimal restraints on schoolhouse searches,
and the most common formulation of the standard used to judge
53
school search cases is reasonable suspicion.
41 Id. at 831.
41 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
46

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (R.S. § 1979).

47 282 A.2d 869 (Dela. 1971).
48 Id. at 871.
4 Given the high degree of state involvement in the public school systems through compulsory education laws, state licensing and regulation of teachers, and numerous simlar provision,
any other result seems contrary to reason as well as precedent. See Bellneir v. Lund, 438 F.
Supp. at 52. In re L.L., 90 Wis.2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (1979).
,w State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317 (La. 1975); In re: Dominic W., 426 A.2d 432 (Md. App.
1981).
s5 Cases cited note 4 supra.
52 State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E. 2d 586 (1975).
53 See, e.g., Bellneir v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. N.Y. 1977). State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d
869 (Dela. 1971); Nelson v. State, 319 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1975); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 978, 992
(1973); In re L.L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (1979).
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The courts have arrived at the reasonable suspicion standard by
employment of the balancing test. This test weighs the school officials
need to search against the student's right to privacy.5 Against the
student's privacy interests, the courts have weighed the special responsibility of school officials to provide for the education, discipline, and
security of their students,5 5 their responsibility to control crime and
drug abuse within the schools,5 6 and to ensure a safe and secure
educational environment for all students.5 7 Accordingly, the courts
have concluded that the reasonable suspicion standard "arrived at by
balancing the privacy rights of the students against the unique administrative responsibilities of the school officials, should adequately protect the students from arbitrary searches and give the school officials
58
enough leeway to fulfill their duties."
Specific factors that the courts look to in applying the reasonable
suspicion standard to determine the sufficiency of the cause to search
are "the child's age, history and record in the school, the prevalence
and seriousness of the problem in the school to which the search was
directed, the exigency to make the search without delay and the
probative value and reliability of the information used as a justification for the search. ' ' 5
In the vast majority of school search cases, the searches in question have been upheld by the courts under this standard. 60 An exception is the case of Bellneir v. Lund,6 1 where the facts surrounding the
search indicated such a glaring abuse of the power to search that the
court was compelled to declare the search illegal even under the
relatively low reasonable suspicion standard. In that case, one of the
pupils in a fifth grade class reported that three dollars had been stolen
from him. As a result, after a search of the desks failed to reveal the
money, the entire fifth grade class was subjected to a strip search. In a
suit for damages, the court declared the search illegal under the
reasonable suspicion standard because school officials had no reason
to "particularize with respect to which students might possess the
money" and instead searched the entire class.62 The court declined to

See, e.g., State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d at 872, Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 827, 832 (New Mex.
1975); People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 731, 736 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
55 State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d at 872.
" Doe v. State, 540 A.2d at 833.
57 State v. Young, 216 S.E. 2d at 592.
540 P.2d 827, 832 (New Mex. 1975).
" Id. at 832.
0 State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Dela. 1971).
61 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
02 Id. at 54.
54
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award damages, however, because the parents failed to prove that the
63
teachers had not acted in good faith in conducting the search.
The case of Nelson v. State6 4 provides an example of a situation in
which the court strained to adopt and apply the reasonable suspicion
standard even though the search in question would clearly have survived the more rigorous probable cause standard. In Nelson, the dean
of boys and a teacher observed a student smoking on school ground in
violation of school rules. One of the officials detected the odor of
marijuana. The Florida court adopted the reasonable suspicion standard and upheld the subsequent search of the student which revealed
marijuana6 5 even though the teachers undoubtedly possessed probable
cause. Because of their direct observations, "the facts and circumstances within their knowledge of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [were] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense had been committed.66 Under this classic formulation of probable cause, the school
officials surely were warranted in their belief that the student had
violated the no smoking regulations, and if it could be shown that the
official who smelled marijuana was sufficiently familiar with its odor,
they were also warranted in their belief that he possessed marijuana.
The adoption of the lower standard is crucial in those cases where
the justification for the search falls somewhere between reasonable
suspicion and probable cause. The search in State v. Baccino,6 7 upheld
under the reasonable suspicion standard, arguably falls within this
category. There, two students were brought to the vice principal's
office for being absent from class impermissibly. The vice principal
accompanied one of the students back to his assigned class. After a
tug-of-war, the vice principal took from the student a coat which the
student was carrying allegedly to make sure that he would go to class.
Since the student was out of class illegally and was known to have
experimented with drugs in the past, the vice principal searched the
coat and found hashish. The court upheld the search under the reasonable suspicion standard without discussing the weight or relevance
of the factors which led to the search.68 Clearly, being out of class
illegally is irrelevant to whether the student possessed drugs. The
tug-of-war over the coat is ambiguous in that it could mean that
either the student did have something to hide, or that he was asserting
61Id. at

55.
319 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1975).
"' Id. at 156.
" Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
V' 282 A.2d 869 (Dela. 1971).
Id. at 872.
4
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his possessory rights in the coat. Although knowledge of past experimentation with drugs is a factor which does legitimately weigh in the
decision to search, 6 it alone adds little to the vice principal's belief
that the student was possessing drugs on the day in question. Therefore, it seems clear that the search would have failed to satisfy probable cause requirements and that it would only survive through loose
69 a
application of the reasonable suspicion standard.
As justification for use of the balancing test in formulating the
reasonable suspicion standard applied to school search cases, the
courts have relied upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Terry v.
Ohio70 and in Camera v. Municipal Court.7 1 In Terry, the Court
considered the legality of protective frisks for weapons by police officers of suspects during the investigative process. The Court reached its
decision in the case by use of the balancing test in which it weighed
the legitimate government interests involved, the need to investigate
criminal activity and to assure the officer's and others' safety during
the investigative stage,72 against the nature and quality of the intrusion to the individual. 73 The Court concluded that if an officer has
reasonable, articulable grounds for believing that criminal activity is
afoot then a protective frisk for weapons is permissible under the
fourth amendment.
Similarly, in Camera, the Court used the balancing test in determining the fourth amendment rights applicable to examinations of
premises conducted by building inspectors. The Court balanced the
legitimate government interest in conducting routine building inspections to protect the public health and safety against the right of
individuals to be free from unwanted intrusions. 75 The Court concluded that a warrant is required but that it need not be based upon
probable cause that the building to be inspected contained violations
but only that the inspection is pursuant to reasonable legislative or
76
administrative standards.
69 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).

See also INRE L.L., 90 Wis. 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (1979).
- 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See, e.g., Bellneir v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. at 53; State v. Baccino, 282 A.
2d at 872; People v. D., 34 N.Y. 2d 466, 469, 315 N.E.2d 466 (1974). IN RE L.L., 90 Wis. 2d
585, 280 N.W.2d 343, 350 (1979).
7- 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See, e.g., State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, 592 (1975);
People v. D., 315 N.E.2d at 469; People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731, 736
(Sup. Ct. 1971).
72 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22-24.
73 Id. at 24-25.
74 Id. at 30.
75 Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 537.
,76 Id. at 538-39.
696

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:140

Although the courts have repeatedly cited to Terry and Camera
as support for the use of the balancing test method for arriving at
appropriate fourth amendment standards, 77 they have not followed
those cases in conducting a careful analysis of the nature of the intrusion to the child before pronouncing the appropriate standards.
The decisions involving school search cases have instead focused
on the school officials' need to search and have all but ignored the
invasion of students' privacy that the search entails. The same reasonable suspicion standard has been used to judge searches as relatively
unintrusive as ordering a student to empty his pockets, 78 to a situation
in which a student's purse was thoroughly searched and her body
subjected to the indignity of a pat-down search, 79 to the extremely
intrusive practice of a strip search.8 0 Application of the same standard to searches so widely disparate in degree of intrusion demonstrates
the courts' one-sided focus.
The fact that the balancing test requires careful analysis of the
nature and degree of intrusion, and adjustment of degree of suspicion
required as the seriousness of the invasion varies, is illustrated very
clearly in the trilogy of cases from the Supreme Court which concerned automobile stops and searches by the border patrol. United
81 ; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
8 2; and
States v. Martinez-Fuerte
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. 83 In Martinez-Fuerte,the Court
upheld stops of vehicles at fixed checkpoints without requiring the
showing of any cause. The stops involved only a very limited intrusion-a brief stop with questioning and visual inspection. 4 The
Court distinguished the case from Brignoni-Ponces5 in which the
Court held that reasonable suspicion was required prior to stops by
roving border patrols which involved the identical procedure, as in
Martinez-Fuerte, but were not conducted at fixed checkpoints. The
Court stated that the degree of subjective intrusion was more in stops
by roving patrols than at fixed checkpoints and that stops by roving
patrols could generate more "concern or even fright" 86 on the part of
travelers. Therefore, greater justification was required for roving

11See notes

72 and 73 supra.

78 Nelson v. State, 319 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1975).
79 In re G.C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (Juv. and Dom Rel. Ct., Union Co. 1972).

80 Bellneir v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1972).
81 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
82 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
83 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
8 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976).
" 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
86

428 U.S. 543, 558 (1975).
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stops. And in Almeida-Sanchez where the nature of the intrusion was
a thorough search of an automobile, the Court required probable
cause. 87 Thus, though in all three instances the interest of the government was identical-the protection of the national borders and prevention of the introduction of illegal aliens or contraband-the standard of suspicion governing the search varied directly with the degree
of intrusion to which the individual was exposed.
Proper application of the balancing test should result in higher
standards particularly in the case of strip searches. Although it appears so obvious as to need no further support, the federal courts have
explicitly recognized that strip searches are extreme invasions of personal privacy in border search cases. They have distinguished strip
searches from other less intrusive searches in formulating the fourth
amendment standards which govern. Thus, while customs officials
are permitted to routinely search the luggage and effects of persons
crossing the national borders,8 8 they must possess reasonable suspicion
prior to a strip search.89
The Second Circuit in the case of United States v. Asbury,"0
explained this distinction by analysis of an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy in both circumstances. They found that "routine searches of a person's belongings and effects are made reasonable
by his decision to cross the border. To this extent, the person involved
has no expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable."9 1 In differentiating strip searches from routine searches,
the court concluded that "although anyone entering or leaving the
country may expect to have his luggage and personal effects examined, he does not expect that his entry or departure, standing alone,
will cause him to be subjected to a strip search. Before a border
official may insist upon such an extensive invasion of privacy, he
should have a suspicion of illegal concealment that is based upon
something more than a border crossing, and the suspicion should be
substantial enough to make the search a reasonable exercise of author92
ity."
In addition to the cause for the search, the manner in which the
search is performed is also carefully scrutinized when the search involves such a serious invasion of privacy. The Ninth Circuit in the case
87 413 U.S. 266 (1973).

88Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).
19 United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Smith, 557 F.2d
1206 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1977).
-0 586 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1978).
9' Id. at 975 (footnotes omitted).
92 Id.
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of United States v. Cameron9 3 stated that "any body search, if it is to
comport with the reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment, must be conducted with regard for the subject's privacy and be
9 4
designed to minimize emotional and physical trauma."
The Supreme Court, in Dunaway v. New York, 95 cast very se-

rious doubt as to whether the use of the balancing test in school search
cases, which resulted in the reasonable suspicion standard, was appropriate in the first place. These decisions severely restrict the scope of
the intrusions which are permissible without the existence of probable
cause and direct that the balancing test only be used for determining
the fourth amendment standards applicable to searches that are very
limited in nature. Courts which have applied the reasonable suspicion
standard to searches as intrusive as strip searches, and relied on the
balancing test approach in Terry for support,96 will be forced to look
elsewhere for their justification.
In Dunaway, the Court considered the constitutionality of police
action in bringing a defendant to the police station for interrogation
when the police concededly did not have probable cause to make an
arrest. The government urged the Court to apply the balancing test
that it had used in Terry to determine whether the police actions here
satisfied fourth amendment requirements.97 In its opinion, the Court
analyzed Terry and its progeny and emphasized that the relatively
minimal intrusion involved in a pat-down search is what justified the
departure from the probable cause standard and its replacement with
the balancing test approach.98 The Court rejected the balancing test
approach in the case under consideration stating that "the narrow
intrusions involved in those cases were judged by a balancing test
rather than by the general principle that fourth amendment seizures
must be supported by the 'long prevailing standards' of probable
cause, (cite omitted) only because these intrusions fell far short of the
kind of intrusion associated with an arrest."99 The Court concluded
that "for all but those narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite 'balancing' has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied

538 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1976).
There the court found that the rectal cavity search of the defendant which included two
digital examinations and forced enemas and laxatives, was illegal because of the shocking
manner in which it was performed even though the border officials had sufficient cause to
request the rectal cavity search. Id. at 260.
95 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979).
" Bellneir v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1972).
97 Dunaway v. New York, 99 S.Ct. at 2256.
98 Id. at 2255.
Id. at 2256.
93
9'
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in the principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by
probable cause."10 0 Since the police officers did not have probable
cause to arrest, and the intrusion was too great to permit the graduated approach of the balancing test, the police action in bringing the
defendant to the station for questioning was illegal under the fourth
amendment.' 0 ' The defendant's subsequent confession was held to be
inadmissible under Wong Sun v. United States, 10 2 as a fruit of the
illegal arrest. 103
Application of Dunaway to school search cases requires first an
examination of the seriousness of the intrusion to which the student
was subjected. If it is a minimal intrusion, then use of the balancing
test approach in arriving at the governing fourth amendment standard is permissible. If it is a more serious intrusion, probable cause
must precede the search.
The Seventh Circuit adopted this approach in the case of M.M. v.
Amker, 10 4 when it applied Dunaway to a strip search in a public
school. The court stated:
We are also of the view that as the intrusiveness of the search
intensifies, the standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness approaches probable cause, even in the school context. cf. Dunaway
(cite omitted) Thus when a teacher conducts a highly intrusive
invasion such as the strip search in this case, it is reasonable to
05
require that probable cause be present. 1
For guidance in determining the legitimate scope of searches
under various circumstances, school officials can look to the past
Supreme Court decisions in this area. Under Terry v. Ohio,106 a school
official who suspects a student of possessing drugs can investigate the
situation and, if the official has reasonable grounds for believing the
student is armed, the official could conduct a protective frisk for
weapons. But Sibron v. New York 10 7 indicates that before a school
official goes any further, such as searching a student's pocket or purse,
the official must have probable cause to believe that the student
possesses contraband. Clearly strip searches, which cannot possibly be
classified as a minimal intrusion, must be based on probable cause.

100Id. at 2257.
101 Id.

102371 U.S. 471 (1963).
103Dunaway v. New York, 99 S.Ct. at 2248.
"04M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1979).
105Id. at 589.
M0 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

107

392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD
WHICH MIGHT APPLY TO STUDENTS?

In spite of the Supreme Court's statement in Dunaway v. New
York '0 8 that only limited searches are permissible if based upon less
than probable cause, 09 there are several judicially recognized exceptions to this general rule. Full body searches have been permitted
within facilities such as prisons or military installations, 0 at the
national borders, " ' and if based upon consent, " 2 without the requirement that probable cause precede the search. The following sections
of the essay will discuss these exceptions to determine what, if any,
application they have to school search cases.
SENSITIVE FACILITIES

The Supreme Court decision in Bell v. Wolfish" 3 permitted
prison officials to subject prisoners to strip searches which included
visual body cavity examinations prior to returning to the general
population following visits. In apparent contradiction to Dunaway,
since the search involved such a serious intrusion of privacy, the Court
used the balancing test to reach its decision." 4 The Court concluded
that the institution's need for security which made it "necessary not
only to discover but also to deter the smuggling of weapons, drugs,
and other contraband into the institution" "1 justified the use of this
measure on a routine basis and permitted the searches without requiring prison officials to show any cause for believing that a prisoner was
concealing contraband." 6 The relevance of this decision to school
search cases depends upon the question of how closely students and
prisoners can be identified for constitutional purposes. In both instances, the need for institutional security has been cited as the reason
for the relaxation of the rules generally governing searches and both

10 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
109Id.
10 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863

(5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Sihler, 562 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1977); Gettlemen v. Werner, 377
F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
...See p. 151 supra. This paper will not include any further discussion of the national border
exception because the situation of students is not comparable to that of persons crossing the
national boundaries. People who cross the borders make a voluntary decision to do so while
students are forced to attend school.
12 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
113441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979).
114 Id. at 1884-85.
115 Id. at 1884.
1 id. at 1886.
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students, because of the compulsory education laws, and prisoners are
required to spend time in their respective institutions.
As an initial distinction, pre-trial detainees such as the prisoners
in Bell v. Wolfish" 7 presumably were arrested pursuant to a police
officer's determination that there was probable cause to believe that
they had committed an offense or they were arrested pursuant to an
indictment or arrest warrant also based upon probable cause. The
existence of probable cause in and of itself can be the basis for the loss
of many freedoms. For example, a person taken into lawful custody
based upon probable cause that s/he has committed a crime, is subject
to a full body search by the police authorities." 8 In addition, if a
judge concurs with the probable cause determination the arrestee is
subject to pre-trial incarceration." 9 Once incarcerated, many rights
and privileges enjoyed by the general public, in addition to fourth
amendment rights, can be withdrawn.12 0 As the Supreme Court
stated, in considering the first amendment right of prisoners to form a
prisoners union, "the informed discretion of prison officials that a
potential danger exists may be sufficient justification for limiting
rights, even though this showing might be 'unimpressive if submitted
as justification for government restriction of personal communication
among the general public.' "121 Unlike students, however, the severe
curtailment of the rights of prisoners can at least be traced back to the
initial determination that there is probable cause to believe that they
are guilty of wrongdoing.
So while students and prisoners are distinguishable in terms of
personal culpability, there is still the issue of whether the institutional
purposes of the schools, education of students, which includes providing a secure environment where education can occur, is similar
enough in character and magnitude to the institutional purposes of
prisons to justify the denial of basic constitutional rights. While the
Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on the impact that the institutional security interests should be given when considering issues of
students' rights, it has approached the question. In Tinker v. Des
Moines, 22 while the Court upheld the first amendment rights of
students to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam War, it did
point to the fact that the school had not demonstrated that the practice of wearing armbands had caused "substantial disruption or mate117

441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979).

118 Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).

11 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
120 Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
"I1Id. at 133 n. 9.
122 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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rial interference with school activities."1 3 This reaffirmed the authority of the state to control conduct within the schools. 2 4 Through
this analysis it suggested broader powers that officials might possess if
presented with a students' rights issue that more directly conflicts with
a school's institutional goals. At the same time, however, it referred
approvingly to a decision of a lower court in which the judge "pointed
out that a school is not like a hospital or jail enclosure" 2 and thereby
suggested that students possess greater constitutional rights than prisoners.
In the case of Ingraham v. Wright, 28 the Court considered directly the distinctions between students and prisoners in deciding
whether to extend the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the
eighth amendment to the practice of corporal punishment in the
schools. It stated that "the prisoner and the school child stand in
wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration."1 27 It went on to note the much
greater deprivation of liberty suffered by prisoners in comparison to
students and the greater degree of openness and community supervision associated with the schools. It concluded that eighth amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment was not needed in
28
the schools.1
Therefore, it appears that although there are similarities between
prisons and schools in that both are public institutions requiring compulsory attendance, the Supreme Court is not yet prepared to equate
them for constitutional purposes. The fact that the educational function of schools is primary and that the host function is secondary, 29
unlike prisons, may further explain the distinction. As the Supreme
Court stated:
That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of constitutional freedoms of the individual,
if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth
to discount important principles of our government as mere plati30
tudes.

123
124

Id. at 514.
Id. at 507.

115Id. at 512 n. 6.
M26430 U.S. 651 (1977).
127 Id. at 669.
128 "The school child has little need for the protection of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 670.
129 Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School BoardAuthority to Regulate Student Conduct
and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U.Penn.L.Rev. 373, 387 (1969).
130West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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In addition to limiting the fourth amendment rights of the prisoners, employees and visitors to prisons and other sensitive facilities
have also been subjected to searches on less than probable cause basis.
The courts have upheld these searches on a consent theory.' 31 Since
students are required to attend school, these cases are inapplicable.
CONSENT

Searches which would otherwise be illegal under the fourth
amendment are permissible if based upon the voluntary consent of the
individual to be searched.1 32 In school search cases, the consent issue
in complicated by the fact that most students are juveniles. In juvenile
cases, some courts subject the government's claim of voluntary consent
to greater scrutiny than in adult cases in recognition of the special
vulnerability and impressionability of juveniles. 3 3 A different consent issue arose during strip search incidents in the Dutchess County,
New York, school system. There, the administrators claimed that they
conducted the searches only after they obtained the consent of the
parents of the child. 34 Whether parents can give valid consent to
searches of the person of their children is an issue that the courts have
not yet confronted although there are numerous decisions concerning
the issue of parental consent to searches of premises.
It is undeniable that parents possess substantial legal rights with
respect to physical control of their children. Parents have the right to
corporally punish children, 35 and the right to withhold or grant
consent to medical treatment. 136 Short of parental action which seriously threatens a child's well-being, as in the case of child abuse, 37 or
parental refusal to seek treatment for serious illness or injury to the
child, 38 the government will not interfere. In fact, the Supreme
Court has suggested "the existence of a constitutional parental right
'13
against undue, adverse interference by the State."
13' United States v. Sihler, 562 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863
(5th Cir. 1977); Gettleman v. Werner, 377 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Pa. 1975). These cases have held
that where individuals have been put on notice that entrance into the facility will subject them
to searches, and they nevertheless seek employment or to visit such an institution, they have
voluntarily consented to be searched.
131 Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
131 Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). Although, in general, juveniles are generally
viewed as capable of giving consent. See, In re Ronny, 40 Misc.2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Fam.
Ct. 1963).
134N.Y. Times, June 28, 1979, section B, at p.4.
13 State v. Hunt, 406 P.2d 208 (Ariz. 1965); Annot., 89 A.L.R. 2d 396 (1963).
I" Friedrichsen v. Niemotka, 71 N.J. Super. 398, 177 A.2d 58 (1962).
131State v. Hunt, 406 P.2d 208 (Ariz. 1965).
I' Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,166-67 (1944).
139Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1979).
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In cases where school administrators claim parental consent to
search a child, however, the parents and the government do not
present conflicting claims to the child but instead have joined forces
against the child. If the Parham v. I.R. 140 case is indicative of the
Supreme Court's disposition in this circumstance, there is no question
but that the independent rights of children carry little weight. 1 4 ' The
Court gave great deference to the parental decision14 2 and provided
the children with only very minimal due process rights, i.e., the
requirement that the parental decision be concurred with by the
admitting physician.143 The Court held that children are not entitled
to a judicial hearing or any other proceedings which would give them
the opportunity to challenge the parent's and physician's determina44
tion that they be committed.
While the Parham case undoubtedly caused great dismay among
the advocates of children's rights, the Bellotti v. Baird 45 case made
clear that the Court is not prepared to grant parents the right of
absolute control over their children. In Bellotti, the Court recognized
that "a child, merely on account of his minority is not beyond the
protection of the Constitution."'' 46 The Court decided that states
which require parental consent to abortion must also provide an
alternative procedure for obtaining authorization and refused to "permit parents to have absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto.' 1 47 The
Court analyzed the permanent and serious consequences to the juvenile which flow from the decision to bear a child and determined that
children had independent rights which were entitled to protection. 4 8
Similarly, in the case of Ruby v. Massey, 149 a federal district court
refused to give a parent the right to consent to the sterilization of her
severely retarded child. The court determined that the child had her
own protected interests in the decision to terminate her child-bearing
capability and that the parent's consent was not sufficient to authorize
the operation. 5 0

140

99 S.Ct. 2493 (1979).

M4'
The Parham case concerned the due process rights of children whose parents decided to
commit them to state mental institutions.
142 Id. at 2505.
143 Id. at 2506-07.
144 Id at 2507.
145 428 U.S. 132, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (1979).
146 Id. at 3042.
M Id. at 3048
148

Id.

452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978).
15oId. at 366.
149
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It appears, then, that at least in the reproductive area, parent's
rights to physical control of children is limited by recognition of the
children's superior rights.
In the fourth amendment area, the parental consent issue has
been raised only with respect to searches of premises. The courts have
generally held that parents, as heads of households, can give valid
consent to searches of premises which they jointly occupy with their
children.' 5' Some courts have restricted the parent's power to give
consent to extend to only those areas to which all family members
have access. 52 At least two cases have held that parental consent
cannot extend to items of which the juvenile has exclusive possession. 53 In United States v. Block, 5 4 while a mother was able to give
valid consent to the search of her son's room to which she had access
for household purposes, the consent extended only to items within
plain view in the room and not to a trunk within which the son stored
55
his possessions.
In conclusion, although the Parham case and common law tradition do invest in parents substantial power over children, this power is
limited when the well-being of the child is threatened or when the
child can assert superior interests to those of the parent. The integrity
of one's own body from searches by state officials seems clearly to be a
case in which the child's interests should prevail over those of the
parent. In any event, the decisions of the courts concerning parental
consent to searches of premises suggest that the courts are willing to
extend the parental power to consent only to those areas in which they
share a common interest with the child. If courts have been unwilling
to grant a parent the power to consent to search of a son's trunk'5 6 or
bag 5 7 it seems highly unlikely that they would permit parents to
consent to the search of their child's body.
REMEDIES

Students who have been charged with criminal offenses as a
result of evidence which was discovered during the course of an illegal
search conducted by school officials have been held to be entitled to
'-' United States v. Stone, 401 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1968); Tolbert v. State, 224 Ga. 291, 161
S.E.2d 279 (1968).
152 People v. Bunker, 22 Mich. App. 396, 177 N.W. 2d 644 (1970).
53 United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978); People v. Mortimer, 46 App. Div.
275, 361 N.Y.S. 2d 955 (1974).
1- 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978).
"
Id. at 541.
"
United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978).
"
People v. Mortimer, 46 App. Div. 2d 275, 361 N.Y.S. 2d 955 (1974).
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the benefit of the exclusionary rule and to have the illegally seized
evidence excluded from their trials.158
In addition, students subjected to illegal searches can bring a civil
suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.151 A school official is liable
for damages under § 1983 if the official "knew or reasonably should
have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student
affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student." 60
The existence of this good faith immunity for school officials led the
court in Bellneir v. Lund"6 ' to deny a reward for damages even
though it found the strip search in question to be illegal. One of the
factors which persuaded the court that the plaintiffs had failed to
show the absence of good faith is that the law is unsettled on the issue
of school searches and the officials had not violated any clearly estab62
lished constitutional rights.1
But while this decision suggests that § 1983 suits based on school
searches might be very difficult to sustain at least until there is more
litigation and judicial agreement on the issue, the case of Picha v.
Weiglos 63 provides support for those who seek to vindicate violation
of constitutional rights through a § 1983 action. There the court
stated:
In terms of the policies set forth in Wood, it appears that law can
be settled without there having been a specific case with identical
facts which was decided adversely to school officials. There is a
limitation to the notion that school officials can have one 'free'
constituconstitutional violation before they are liable for ignoring
16 4
tional rights that arise in each unique factual setting.
In two recent cases, the courts imposed damages under § 1983 for
unreasonable strip searches of students. In Doe v. Renfrow 65 and
M.M. v. Anker,16 6 the Seventh and Second Circuits declined to extend
a good faith immunity defense to school officials who unreasonably
" Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317 (La.
1975); People v. D., 34 N.Y. 2d 483, 315 N.E. 2d 466 (1974).
5, Bellneir v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. N.Y. 1977); Picha v. Wieglos, 410 F. Supp. 1214
(N.D. Ill. 1976).
'e
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1001 (1975).
161438 F.Supp. 47, 55 (N.D. N.Y. 1977).
M62Id. at 54-55.
163 410 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D. I11. 1976).
M

Id. at 1219.

631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980).
1" 607 F.2d 588 (2nd Cir. 1979).
5
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subjected students to the searches. The court in Doe v. Renfrow
stated:
It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude
search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional
rights of some magnitude. More than that, it is a violation of any
known principle of human decency apart from any constitutional
readings and rulings, simple common sense would indicate that the
conduct of the school officials in permitting such a nude search was
not only unlawful but outrageous under 'settled principles of law'
...Wood v. Strickland . . . accords immunity to school officials
who act in good faith and within the bounds of reason. We suggest
as strongly as possible that the conduct herein described 6exceeded
7
the 'bounds of reason' by two and a half country miles."'
These decisions indicate that the courts are willing to impose
damages if school officials act unreasonably, particularly if a gross
violation of a student's rights results. Perhaps this fact alone will cause
school officials and teachers to exercise restraint.
CONCLUSION

The determination of the appropriate standards governing school
searches requires not only an analysis of fourth amendment law, but
also an analysis of juvenile law and the law related to other constitutional rights of students. It is not surprising that the lower courts,
which have had the responsibility for formulating these standards
with very little guidance from the Supreme Court, have produced a
wealth of contradictory decisions. What is disturbing, however, is the
consistency with which the courts have found that students are entitled to few, if any, fourth amendment protections.
The diminished fourth amendment rights of students is significant in the context of the high crime and serious drug problems which
plague the schools. School officials will be tempted to disregard the
privacy rights of students in an effort to bring the situation under
control. It is proposed that before school officials be permitted to
search students, they must possess probable cause.
The shift from the "reasonable suspicion" to the "probable cause"
standard, together with increased civil liability, may prevent situations in which students are subjected to unreasonable searches, because of hasty decisions by teachers or school officials. Students, like
adults, must be protected from unwarranted invasions of privacy.

"1'631

F.2d at 92.
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When the search involves an extreme intrusion of a child's privacy,
such as a strip search, which is undoubtedly both frightening and
humiliating, teachers and school officials should be required to exercise great restraint. At the minimum, they should possess probable
cause that the search will produce contraband.

